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Abstract 
Starting with a likelihood or preference or­
der on worlds, we extend it to a likeli­
hood ordering on sets of worlds in a nat­
ural way, and examine the resulting logic. 
Lewis [1973] earlier considered such a no­
tion of relative likelihood in the context of 
studying counterfactuals, but he assumed a 
total preference order on worlds. Compli­
cations arise when examining partial orders 
that are not present for total orders. There 
are subtleties involving the exact approach 
to lifting the order on worlds to an order on 
sets of worlds. In addition, the axiomatiza­
tion of the logic of relative likelihood in the 
case of partial orders gives insight into the 
connection between relative likelihood and 
default reasoning. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Preferential .!tructure! consist of a set of worlds par­
tially (pre )ordered by a reflexive, transitive relation 
!'::::-1 Various readings have been given to the >-relation 
in the literature; u !':::: v has been interpreted as "u at 
least as preferred or desirable as v" [Kraus, Lehmann 
and Magidor 1990; Doyle, Shoham, and Wellman 1991] 
(it is this reading that leads to the term "preferential 
structure"), "u at least as normal (or typical) as v" 
[Boutilier 1994], and "u is no more remote from actu­
ality than v" [Lewis 1973]. In this paper, we focus on 
one other interpretation, essentially also considered by 
Lewis [1973). We interpret u !':::: v as meaning "u is at 
least as likely as v". 2 
1 A partial order R is typically assumed to be reflex­
ive, transitive, and anti-.symmetric (so that if R( a., b) and 
R(b, a.), then a::= b). We are not assuming that � is anti­
symmetric here, which is why it is a preorder. 
. 
2There is a tradition, starting with Lewis [19731, of tak­
mg u � 'V, rather than u � 'V, to mean that u is as pre­
ferred or as desirable as 'II. This last reading historically 
comes from the interpretation of the preferred world as be-
In the literature, preferential structures have been 
mainly used to give semantics to conditional logics 
[Lewis 1973] and, more recently, to nonmonotonic logic 
[Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor 1990]. The basic 
modal operator in these papers has been a conditional 
-+, where p-+q is interpreted as "in the most pre­
ferred/normal/likely worlds satisfying p, q is the case". 
However, if we view !':::: as representing likelihood, then 
it seems natural to define a binary operator � on for­
mulas such that r.p � 1/J is interpreted as "r.p is more 
likely than 1/J". Lewis [1973) in fact did define such 
an operator, and showed how it related to -+ . How­
ever, he started with a total preorder on worlds, not a 
partial preorder. 
!n many cases in preferential or likelihood reasoning, 
It seems more appropriate to start with a partial pre­
order rather than a total preorder. As we show in this 
paper, there are some subtleties involved in starting 
with a partial preorder. What we are ultimately inter­
ested in is not an ordering on worlds, but an ordering 
on sets of worlds. To make sense of a statement like 
r.p � 1/J, which we read as "r.p is more likely than 1/J", 
we need to compare the relative likelihood of the set 
of worlds satisfying t.p to that of the set satisfying 1/J. 
Notice that for technical reasons (that should shortly 
become clear), we take as our basic primitive a strict 
comparison {"more likely"), rather than the nonstrict 
version ("at least as likely"). Given a preorder !':::: on 
worlds, it is easy to define a strict order >- on worlds: 
u >-v if u !':::: v and not( v !':::: u) . Moreover, it is straight­
forward to extend !':::: and >- to preorders !'::::* and >-• on 
sets of worlds. Roughly speaking, we say that U >-• V 
if for every world v E V, there is a world u E U -;uch 
that u !':::: v; we can similarly define >-• ,  using >-- De­
fine U >-' V if U !'::::* V and not(V t• U). An obvious 
question is now whether >-' and ::--• are equivalent. It 
is not hard to show that they are if !'::::, the original pre­
order on worlds, is a total preorder. {This is precisely 
the case considered by Lewis.) On the other hand, it 
ing less far from actuality. Since there seems to be a split in 
the reading in the literature, and t has traditionally been 
taken to mean at least as likely in the literature on qual· 
itative probability [Fine 1973; Giirdenfors 1975], we take 
the more natural reading here. 
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is also not hard to construct a counterexample show­
ing that, in general, they are different. While U � • V 
implies U �� V, the converse does not always hold. 
While both � • and �� are reasonable notions, using 
� • allows us to make more interesting connections to 
conditional logic, so that is what we focus on in this 
paper. 
More interesting observations arise when we try to ax­
iomatize the likelihood operator. Lewis provided an 
axiomatization for the case of total preorders; we pro­
vide one here for the case of partial preorders. The 
key axioms used by Lewis were transitivity: 
and the union property: 
This latter property is characteristic of possibility logic 
[Dubois and Prade 1990]. In the partially ordered case, 
these axioms do not suffice. We need the following 
axiom: 
It is not hard to show that this axiom implies transi­
tivity and the union property (in the presence of the 
other axioms), but it is not equivalent to them. In­
terestingly, it is the property captured by this axiom 
that was isolated in [Friedman and Halpern 1995] as 
being the key feature needed for a likelihood ordering 
on sets to be appropriate for doing default reasoning 
in the spirit of [Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor 1990]. 
Thus, by allowing the generality of partial preorders, 
we are able to clarify the connections between », -+, 
and default reasoning. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec­
tion 2, we consider how to go from a partial preorder on 
worlds to a partial preorder on sets of worlds, focusing 
on the differences between partial and total preorders. 
In Section 3, we present a logic for reasoning about 
relative likelihood, and provide a natural complete ax­
iomatization for it. In Section 4, we relate our results 
to other work on relative likelihood, as well as to work 
on conditional logic and nonmonotonic reasoning. We 
conclude in Section 5. 
2 FROM PREORD ERS ON 
WORLDS TO PREORDERS ON 
SETS OF WORLDS 
We capture the likelihood ordering on a set W of pos­
sible worlds by a partial preorder-that is, a reflexive 
and transitive relation-::: on W. We typically write 
W1 :::= w rather than (w, w1) E :::: . As usual, we take 
u ::5 v to be an abbreviation for v t u, u � v to be 
an abbreviation for u tv and not(v t u) , and u-< v 
to be an abbreviation for v ;- u. The relation � is a 
strict partial order, that is, it is an irreflexive (for all 
w, it is not the case that w � w) and transitive rela­
tion on W. We say that � is the strict partial order 
determined by t. 
As we said in the introduction, we think of t as pro­
viding a likelihood, or preferential, ordering on the 
worlds in W. Thus, w t w1 holds if w is at least 
as likely/preferred/normal/dose to actuality as w1• 
Given this interpretation, the fact that t is assumed 
to be a partial preorder is easy to justify. For example, 
transitivity just says that if u is at least as likely as 
v, and v is at least as likely as w, then u at least as 
likely as w. Notice that since t is a partial preorder, 
there may be some pairs of worlds w and w' that are 
incomparable according to ::::. Intuitively, we may not 
be prepared to say that either one is likelier than the 
other. We say that t is a total preorder (or connected, 
or a linear preorder) if for all worlds w and w1, either 
w t w1 or w1 t w. 
Since we have added likelihood to the worlds, it seems 
reasonable to also add likelihood to the language, to 
allow us to say "cp is more likely than 1/J", for example. 
But what exactly should this mean? Although hav­
ing t in our semantic model allows us to say that one 
world is more likely than another, it does not imme­
diately tell us how to say that a set of worlds is more 
likely than another set. But, as we observed in the 
introduction, this is just what we need to make sense 
of "cp is more likely than t/;". 
There are a number of reasonable ways of extending 
the likelihood ordering on worlds to a likelihood or­
dering on sets. We explore one general approach here, 
essentially due to Lewis (1973], which has the advan­
tage of being reasonably natural and of having some 
nice technical properties. Roughly speaking, we take 
U to be more likely than V if for every world in V, 
there is a more likely world in U. 
To make this precise, first suppose that W is finite. If 
U, V � W, we write U ::::• V if for every world v E V, 
there is a world u E U such that u t v. It is easy 
to check that :::=• as defined on finite sets is a partial 
preorder, that is, it is reflexive and transitive. More­
over, if :::= is a total preorder 1 then so is :::= •. Finally, 
as we would expect, we have u t v iff { u} ::::• { v }, so 
the ::::• relation on sets of worlds can be viewed as a 
generalization of the t relation on worlds. 
In a similar spirit, we can define � • on finite sets by 
taking U � • V to hold if U is nonempty, and for every 
world v E V, there is a world u E U such that u � v. 
As in the introduction, define U )-1 V as an abbrevi­
ation for U ::::=• V and not(V ::::• U). It is easy to see 
that u � v iff {u} ;-• {v} iff {u} ;- ' {v}. Thus, �· 
and �� agree on singleton sets and extend the � rela­
tion on worlds. Moreover, both �· and )-1 are strict 
partial orders on finite sets. (The requirement that 
U must be nonempty in the definition of U � • V is 
there to ensure that we do not have 0 � • 0.) As shown 
in Lemma 2.9, �� and � • are in fact identical if the 
underlying preorder t on worlds is a total preorder. 
However, as the following example shows, >-• and >-' 
are not identical in general. 
Example 2.1: Suppose W :::: { w1, w2}, and t is such 
that w1 and w� are incomparable. Then it is easy to 
see that {w1,w2} >-' {w1} . However, it is not the case 
that {w1,w2} >-* {wt}, since there is no element of 
{ w1, w2} that is strictly more likely than w1. I 
Notice that we were careful to define >- as we did only 
on finite sets. The following example illustrates why: 
Example 2.2: Let V00 :::: {w0, w1, w2, . • •  }, and sup­
pose that t is such that 
wo -< w1 -< w2 -< ... 
Then it is easy to see that if we were to apply the 
definition of >-• to infinite sets, then we would have 
W 00 >-• W 00, and >- would not be irreflexive. I 
The approach for extending the definition of >-• to 
infinite sets is also due to Lewis [1973]. The idea is 
to say that in order to have U >-• V, it is not enough 
that for every element v in V there is some element 
u in U that is more likely than v. This definition 
is what allows Woo >- Woo in Example 2.2. Notice 
that in the finite case, it is easy to see that if U >-• 
V, then for every element v in V, there must some 
u E U such that, not only do we have u >- v, but u 
dominates V in that, for no v1 E V do we have v' >­
u. It is precisely this domination condition that does 
not hold in Example 2.2. This observation provides 
the motivation for the official definition of t• and >-•, 
which applies in both finite and infinite domains. 
Definition 2.3: Suppose t is a partial preorder on 
W, U, V � W, and wE W. We say that w dominates 
V if for no v E V is it the case that v >- w. (Notice 
that if t is a total preorder, this is equivalent to saying 
that w t v for all v E V.) We write U t* V if, for 
all v E V, there exists u E U such that u t v and u 
dominates V. We write U >-• V if U is nonempty and, 
for all v E V, there exists u E U such that u >- v and 
u dominates V. Finally, we define U >-' V if U >-• V 
and not(V t* U) . I 
-
It is easy to see that these definitions of t•, >-*,and 
>-' agree with our earlier definitions if U and V are 
finite. We now collect some properties of >-•, >-', and 
t•. To do this, we need a few definitions. 
We say that a relation R on 2w (not necessarily a 
preorder) is qualitative if {V1 U V2) R V3 and (V1 U 
V3) R V2 implies V1 R(V2 U V3). We say that R sat­
isfies the union property if V1 R V2 and V1 R V3 implies 
V1 R (V2 U V3). We say that R is orderly if U R V, 
U' 2 U, and V' � V implies U' RV'. As we now 
show, orderly qualitative relations always have the 
union property. 
Lemma 2.4: If R is an orderly qualitative relation 
on 2w, then R is transitive and satisfies the union 
property. 
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Proof: Suppose R is an orderly qualitative rela­
tion. To see that R is transitive, suppose V1 R V� 
and V2 R V3• Since R is orderly, it follows that 
(V1 U V3) R V� and (V1 U V2) R V{ Since R is quali­
tative, it follows that V1 R (V� U Va). From the fact 
that R is orderly, we get that V1 R V3• Thus, R is 
transitive, as desired. 
To see that R satisfies the union property, suppose 
V1 R V2 and V1 R V3. Since R is orderly, we have that 
(V1 U Vg) RV2 and (V1 U V2) RV3. Using the fact that 
R is qualitative, we get that V1 R (V2 U V3). Hence, R 
satisfies the union property. I 
The converse to Lemma 2.4 does not hold. In­
deed, an orderly strict partial order on 2w may sat­
isfy the union property and still not he qualitative. 
For example, suppose W = {a, b, c}, and we have 
{a,b} R{c}, {a,c} R{b}, {a,b, c} R{b}, {a, b,c} R{c}, 
and {a, b, c} R{b, c}. It can easily be checked that R is 
an orderly strict partial order that satisfies the union 
property, but is not qualitative. 
With these definitions in hand, we can state the key 
properties of the relations we are interested in here. 
Proposition 2.5: 
(a) If t is a partial preorder on W, then t• is an 
orderly partial preorder on 2w that satisfies the 
union property. 
(b) If:_: is a partial preorder on W, then >-' is an 
orderly strict partial order on 2w. 
(c) If>- is a strict partial order on W, then >-• is an 
orderly qualitative strict partial order on 2w. 
Proof: We prove part (c) here; the proof of parts (a) 
and (b) is similar in spirit, and is left to the reader. 
The fact that >- • is an orderly strict partial order is 
straightforward, and is also left to the reader. To see 
that >-. is qualitative, suppose vl u v2 >-. v3 and 
V1 U V3 >-* V2. Let v E V2 U Vg. We must show that 
there is some v1 E V1 that dominates V2 U V3 such 
that v' >- v. Suppose without loss of generality that 
v E V2 (an identical argument works if v E V3). Since 
V1 U V3 >-• V2, there is some u E V1 U V3 that dominates 
v2 such that u >- v. If u dominates v3, then it clearly 
dominates V2UV3 and it must be in V1, so we are done. 
Thus, we can assume that u does not dominate V3, so 
there is some element u' E V3 such that u/ t u. Since 
V1 U V2 >-* Vj, there must be some v' E V1 U V2 such 
that v' dominates V3 and v' >- u'. Since u dominates 
V2 and u' t u, it follows that u dominates V2. Since 
v' >- u', we must have that v' dominates V2. Hence, v' 
dominates V2 U V3• It follows that v' cannot be in V2, 
so it must be in V1. Thus, we have an element in Vt, 
namely v', such that v' >- v and v' dominates V2 U Va, 
as desired. I 
There are several observations worth making regard-
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ing this result. Clearly the union property general­
izes to arbitrary finite unions. That is, if u � v; for 
j = l, . . . ,N, then {u} �· {vt, ... ,vN}, no matter 
how large N is, and similarly if we replace � by >­
(since the fact that >-• is qualitative means that it 
satisfies the union property, by Lemma 2.4). This 
is very different from probability, where sufficiently 
many "small" probabilities eventually can dominate 
a "large" probability. This suggests that u >- v should 
perhaps be interpreted as "u is much more likely than 
v". In this sense, the notion of likelihood being inves­
tigated here is closer to possibility (Dubois and Prade 
1990) (which also satisfies this property) than proba­
bility. Also notice that, in general, >-' does not sat­
isfy the union property (and hence is not qualitative), 
and � is not qualitative . In Example 2.1, we have 
{ Wt, w�} >-' { Wt} and { Wt, w�} >-' { w:;�}, but we do not 
have {w1,w2} >-' {w1,w2}. This example also shows 
that �· is not qualitative, since if it were, we could 
conclude from {wt. w2} �· {w2} (taking VI = {w1} 
and V2 = V3 = { w2} in the definition of qualitative) 
that {w1} ):• {w2}, a contradiction. 
If � is a total preorder, then we get further connec­
tions between these notions. Before we discuss the 
details, we need to define the analogue of total pre­
orders in the strict case. A relation R on an arbitrary 
set W' (not necessarily of the form 2w) is modular 
if WI R w:;� implies that, for all wa, either wa R w2 or 
w1 R wa. Modularity is the "footprint" of a. total pre­
order on the strict order derived from it. This is made 
precise in the following lemma. 
Lemma 2.6: If� is a total preorder, then the strict 
partial order>- determined by� i.s modular. Moreover, 
if R is a modular, strict partial order on W 1 then there 
is a total preorder � on W such that R is the strict 
partial order determined by �. 
Proof: Suppose � is a total preorder. To see that >­
is modular, suppose that w1 >- w2• Given an arbitrary 
wa, if wa � Wt1 it follows from the transitivity of � 
that w3 >- w2. On the other hand, if it is not the case 
that wa � Wt, then Wt >- w3• Thus, we have that 
either w3 >- w2 or w1 >- wa, so >- is modular. 
Now suppose that R is a. modular strict partial or­
der on W. Define >- so that w >- v either if w R v or 
if neither w R v nor v R v hold.-Clearly, � is reflex­
iv-e. To see that it is transitive, suppose that VI � '112 
and v2 � va. There are three cases: ( 1) If v1 R v2, 
then since R is modular, we have that either VI R v3 
or va R v2. We cannot have Va R v2, for then we would 
not have vl � va. Thus, we must have v1 R va, and 
hence v1 � va. (2) If v2 Rv3, then using modularity 
again, we get that either v1 R v3 or v2 R v1• Again, we 
cannot have v2 R v11 so we must have viR v3, and so 
we also have Vt � V3. (3) If neither v1 R v2 nor v2 R va 
hold, then we claim that neither Vt R v3 nor V3 R Vt 
hold. For if v1 R v3, then by modularity, we must have 
either v1 R v2 or v2 R va. And if v3 R v1, then either 
v3 R v2 or v2 R v1, which contradicts the assumption 
that VI !:::: v� and v� t v3• Thus, we can again con­
clude that VI � va. Thus, t is transitive. Finally, it 
is almost immediate from the definition that R is the 
strict partial order determined by t. I 
Modularity is preserved when we lift the preorder from 
W to 2w. 
Lemma 2. 7: If >- is a mod11olar relation on W, then 
>- • is a mod11olar relation on 2w. 
Proof: Suppose >- is modular. We want to show that 
>-• is modular. So suppose that V1 >- • V2, and it is not 
the case that V1 >-• Va. We must show that Va :>-• v •. 
Since it is not the case that V1 >-• V3, there must be 
some v• E V3 such that for all u E V1, we do not have 
u >- v•. Now suppose v E V2. We claim that v• >- v. 
To see this, note that since Vt >- • V2, there must be 
some u• E V1 such that u• >- v. Since >- is modular, 
we have that either u* >- v• or v• >- v. Since, by choice 
of v•, we do not have u• >- v•, we must have v• >- v. 
It follows that V3 >-• V2• I 
Although we showed that the converse to Lemma 2.4 
does not hold in general for strict partial orders, it 
does hold for orders that are modular. 
Lemma 2.8: If R is a modular strict partial order 
and satisfies the union property, then R is qualitative. 
Proof: Suppose that R is modular strict partial order 
that satisfies the union property. To see that R is qual­
itative, suppose that (VI U V2) R V3 and (Vt U V3) R V2. 
Since R is modular, it follows that either {Vt UV2) R VI 
or V1 R Va. If (Vi UV2) R V1, then, using the fact that R 
satisfies the union property and (VI U V2) R Va, we get 
that (VI U V2) R {VI U V3). Using transitivity, it follows 
that {VI U V2) R V2• Using the union property again, 
we get that {V1 U V2) R (V1 U V2). This contradicts the 
assumption that R is irreflexive. Thus, we must have 
that V1 R V3. A similar argument shows that V1 R V2. 
Using the union property, we get that VIR (V2 U Va), 
as desired. I 
As shown in [Friedman and Halpern 1995), there is 
a connection between nonmonotonic reasoning, con­
ditional logic, and the qualitative property. (This is 
discussed in Section 4.) It is because of this relation­
ship that we consider >-• rather than �· or >-'. Lewis 
[1973) was able to use >-' because he focused on total 
preorders. The following lemma. makes this precise. 
Lemma 2.9: If� is a total preorder, then>-" and>-' 
agree. In general, U >-" V implies U >-' V, but the 
converse does not hold. 
Proof: It is immediate from the definitions that U >- • 
V implies U >-' V, and the fact that the converse does 
not hold is shown by Example 2.1. To show that >-• 
and >-' are equivalent if � is a total preorder, suppose 
U >-' V .  Clearly U is nonempty, since V !:* 0 for 
all V. We want to show that U >-• V, so we must 
show that for all 11 E V ,  there is some u E U that 
dominates V such that u >- 11. Given 11 E V ,  since 
U !: • V ,  there must be some u E U that dominates V 
such that u !: 11. If u >- 11, then we are done. If not, 
then v !: u. Since it is not the case that V !: U, there 
must be some u1 E U such that it is not the case that 
11!: u'. Since !: is a total order, we must have u' >- 11. 
Since 11 :>- u, we also have u' >- u. Since u dominates 
V, so do-;s u1• It follows that U >-• V ,  as desired. I 
We close this section by considering when a preorder 
on 2w can be viewed as being generated by a preorder 
on W. This result turns out to play a key role in 
our completeness proof, and emphasizes the role of the 
qualitative property. 
Theorem 2.10: Let :F be a finite algebra of subsets 
of W (that is, :F is a set of subsets of W that is closed 
under union and complementation and contains W it­
self} and R an orderly qualitative relation on :F. 
(a) If R is a total preorder on :F, then there is a 
total preorder !: on W such that R and !:* agree 
on :F (that is, for U, V E :F, we have U RV iff 
u t• v ). 
(b) If R is a strict partial order and each non empty 
set in :F has at least 2I:FI•·c•••<l-"ll elements, then 
there is a partial preorder >- on W such that R 
and:>- • agree on :F. 
Proof: An atom of :F is a minimal nonempty element 
of :F. Since :F is finite, it is easy to see that every 
element of :F can be written as a union of atoms, and 
the atoms are disjoint. Part (a) is easy: for each w E 
W ,  let Aw be the unique atom in :F containing w. 
Define !: on W so that v !: w iff A., R Aw . It is easy 
to see that if R is a total preorder on :F, then !: is a 
total preorder on W and R agrees with !:* on :F. The 
proof of (b) is considerably more difficult; we leave 
details to the full paper. I 
It is not clear that the requirement that the sets in :F 
I:FIIIogi••(IFI) . have at least 2 elements 1s necessary. How-
ever, it can be shown that Theorem 2.10(b) does not 
hold without some assumption on the cardinality of 
elements in :F. For example, suppose that the atoms 
of :F are A, B, and C. Let R be defined so that the 
only sets related by R are (B U C) R A, W R A, and 
X R0 for all nonempty X E F. It is easy to see that 
R is a strict partial order, R is orderly, and R is qual­
itative. However, if W = {a,b,c}, A= {a}, B = {b}, 
and C = {c}, there is no ordering >- on W such that 
:>-• and R agree on :F: it is easy to see that such an 
ordering >- must make a, b, and c incomparable. But if 
they are incomparable, we cannot have {b, c} >- • {a}. 
On the other hand, if we allow C to have two ele­
ments, by taking W ={a, b, c, d}, A= {a}, B = {b}, 
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and C = {c, d}, then there is an ordering >- such that 
>-• = R: we simply take a >- c and b >- d. 
3 A LOGIC OF RELATIVE 
LIK ELIHOOD 
We now consider a logic for reasoning about relative 
likelihood. Let til be a set of primitive propositions. 
A basic likelihood formula (over til) is one of the form 
tp :» 1/1, where tp and 1/! are propositional formulas over 
til. We read tp » 1/! as "tp is more likely than 1/1". Let 
.C consist of Boolean combinations of basic likelihood 
formulas. Notice that we do not allow nesting of like­
lihood in .C, nor do we allow purely propositional for­
mulas. There would no difficulty extending the syntax 
and semantics to deal with them, but this would just 
obscure the issues of interest here. 
A preferential structure (over til) is a tuple M = 
(W, !:,11'), where W is a (possibly infinite) set of possi­
ble worlds, !: is a partial preorder on W, and 11' asso­
ciates with each world in W a truth assignment to the 
primitive propositions in til. Notice that there may be 
two or more worlds with the same truth assignment. 
As we shall see, in general, we need to have this, al­
though in the case of total preorders, we can assume 
without loss of generality that there is at most one 
world associated with each truth assignment. 
We can give semantics to formulas in .C in preferential 
structures in a straightforward way. For a proposi­
tional formula cp, let [tp]M consist of the worlds in M 
whose truth assignment satisfies cp. We then define 
M I= I{>» 1/! if [cp]M :-• [1/!]M· 
We extend I= to Boolean combinations of basic formu­
las in the obvious way. 
Notice that M I= -{·-.cp :» false) iff [-.tp]M = 0 iff 
[IP]M = W. Let K cp be an abbreviation for -.( -.cp :» 
false). It follows that M I= Kcp iff tp is true at all 
possible worlds.3 
With these definitions, we can provide a sound and 
complete axiomatization for this logic of relative like­
lihood. Let AX consist of the following axioms and 
inference rules. 
Ll. All substitution instances of tautologies of propo­
sitional calculus 
L2. -.(cp :» tp) 
L3. ((IPl V 1P2 :» 1{>3) 1\ (IPl V cpg » tp2)) � (cp1 � 
1P2 V IP3) 
14. (K( cp � tp1) 1\ K( 1/!' ::::} 1/1) 1\ ( 1P :» 1/1)) � tp1 :» 1/!' 
MP. From tp and tp ::::} 1/; infer 1/! (Modus ponens) 
Gen. From cp infer K;tp (Knowledge Generalization) 
Note that L2, 13, and L4 just express the fact that >-• 
is irreflexive, orderly, and qualitative, respectively. 
3 K was defined by Lewis [1973], although he used D. 
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Theorem 3.1: AX is a sound and complete azioma­
tization of the language £ with respect to preferential 
structures. 
Proof: The soundness of L1 is immediate. It is clear 
that the fact that )-* is irreflexive and qualitative, as 
shown in Proposition 2.5, implies that L2 and L3 are 
sound. To see that L4 corresponds to orderliness, note 
that if M F K(lf' :::> lf'1)1\K('!f' :::> '1/J) and If'� '1/l, then 
[lf']M � [lf'']u, ['!f']u � ['1/J]u, and [lf']M :.-• ['!f]M· 
Since:.-* is orderly, it follows that [lf'']u :.-• ['1/J']M, so 
M F 1f>1 � '1/J'. Thus, L4 is sound. It is also clear that 
MP and Gen preserve validity. 
The completeness proof starts out, as is standard for 
completeness proofs in modal logic, with the observa­
tion that it suffices to show that a consistent formula 
is satisfiable. That is, we must show that for every for­
mula If' for which it is not the case that -.If' is provable 
from AX is satisfiable in some preferential structure 
M. However, the standard modal logic techniques 
of constructing a canonical model (see, for example, 
[Hughes and Cresswell 1968]) do not seem to work in 
this case. Finding an appropriate partial preorder is 
nontrivial. For this we use (part (b) of) Theorem 2.10. 
We leave details to the full paper. I 
What happens if we start with a total preorder? Let 
AXM consist of AX together with the obvious axiom 
expressing modularity: 
We say that a preferential structure is totally pre­
ordered if it has the form (W, �. 1r), where� is a total 
preorder on W. 
Theorem 3.2: AXM is a sound and complete aziom­
atization of the language £ with respect to totally pre­
ordered preferential structures. 
We remark that in light of Proposition 2.4, we can re­
place 14 in AX M by axioms saying that � is transitive 
and satisfies the union property, namely: 
16. ((lf'l � lf'2) 1\ (lf'2 � lf'3)) :::> (<J'l � <J'3) 
17. ((lf'l � lf'2) v (<J'l � 'P3)) :::> (<J'l � 'Pl v <J'2) 
The result is an axiomatization that is very similar to 
that given by Lewis [1973]. 
In the proof of Theorem 3.1, when showing that a 
consistent formula cp is satisfiable, the structure con­
structed may have more than one world with the same 
truth assignment. This is necessary, as the following 
example shows. (We remark that this observation is 
closely related to the cardinality requirements in The­
orem 2.10(b).) 
Example 3.3: Suppose � = {p, q}. Let If' be the 
formula (p � -.p 1\ q) 1\ -.(p 1\ q � ....,p 1\ q) 1\ ....,(p 1\ 
....,q � ....,p 1\ q ). It is easy to see that cp is satisfied in a 
structure consisting of four worlds, w1, w2, w3, W41 such 
that w1 >-- w3, w2 )- w4, pl\q is true at w1, p/\ -.q is true 
at w2, and ....,pl\q is true at both w3 and W4. However, 
If' is not satisfiable in any structure where there is at 
most one world satisfying -.pl\q. For suppose M were 
such a structure, and let w be the world in M satisfying 
-.pl\q. Since M F p � ....,pl\q, it must be the case that 
[p]u >-- • { w }. Thus, there must be a world w' E [p]u 
such that w' >-- w. But w' must satisfy one of p 1\ q or 
p 1\ ....,q, so M f= (p 1\ q � -.p 1\ q) V (p 1\ -.q � -.p 1\ q), 
contradicting the assumption that M I= <p. I 
It is not hard to see that the formula cp of Example 3.3 
is not satisfiable in a totally preordered preferential 
structure. This is not an accident. 
Proposition 3.4: If a formula is satisfiable in a to­
tally preordered preferential structure, then it is satis­
fiable in a totally preordered preferential structure with 
at most one world per truth auignment. 
The results of this and the previous section help em­
phasize the differences between totally preordered and 
partially preordered structures. 
4 RELATED WORK 
The related literature basically divides into two groups 
(with connections between them): other approaches to 
relative likelihood, and work on conditional and non­
monotonic logic. 
We first consider relative likelihood. Gardenfors [1975] 
considered a logic of relative likelihood, but he took 
as primitive a total preorder on the sets in 2w, and 
focused on connections with probability. In particular, 
he added axioms to ensure that, given a preorder �· 
on 2w, there was a probability function Pr with the 
property that (in our notation) U �· V iff Pr(U) � 
Pr(V). Fine (1973] defines a qualitative notion � of 
comparative probability, but like Gardenfors, assumes 
that the preorder on sets is primitive, and is largely 
concerned with connections to probability. 
Halpern and Rabin (1987] consider a logic of likeli­
hood where absolute statements about likelihood can 
be made (<pis likely, 'ljJ is somewhat likely, and so on), 
but there is no notion of relative likelihood. 
Of course, there are many more quantitative notions 
of likelihood, such as probability, possibility [Dubois 
and Prade 1990], ordinal conditional functions (OCFs) 
[Spohn 1987], and Dempster-Shafer belief functions 
[Shafer 1976]. The ones closest to the relative likeli­
hood considered here are possibility and OCFs. Recall 
that a possibility measure Poss on W associates with 
each world its possibility, a number in [0, 1], such that 
for V � W, we have Poss(V) = sup{Poss(v): v E V}, 
with the requirement that Poss(W) = 1. Clearly a 
possibility measure places a total preorder on sets, 
and satisfies the union property, since Poss(A U B) = 
max(Poss(A), Poss(B)). The same is true for OCFs; 
we refer the reader to [Spohn 1987] for details. Farinas 
del Cerro and Herzig [1991] define a logic QPL (Qual­
itative Possibilistic Logic) with a modal operator <l, 
where <p <l1/J is interpreted as Poss([<p]) S Poss([.,P]). 
Clearly, <p <l1/J essentially corresponds to 1/J :» <p. They 
provide a complete axiomatization for their logic; fur­
ther discussion of the logic can be found in [Bendova 
and Hajek 1993] . Not surprisingly, an analogue of 
AXM is also complete for the logic. We discuss fur­
ther connections between possibility measures, OCFs, 
and our logic below, in the context of conditionals. 
Finally, we should mention the work of Doyle, Shoham, 
and Wellman [1991]. They define a logic of relative de­
sire, starting with a preference order on worlds. They 
extend this to a preference order on sets, but in a much 
different way than we do. Using � for their notion, 
they define U � V ifu t v  for every u E U and v E V; 
a strict notion > can be similarly defined. It is easy 
to see that U > V is not equivalent to U � V and 
not(U � V), even if t is a total preorder, although 
it implies it. Clearly, U � V implies U t• V and 
U > V implies U >- * V, but the converse does not 
hold. The requirements for 2: and > are significantly 
stronger than those fort* and>-*. As Doyle, Shoham, 
and Wellman themselves point out, these relations are 
too weak to allow us to make important distinctions. 
They go on to define other notions of comparison, but 
these are incomparable to the notions considered here, 
and are more tuned to their applications. 
We now turn our attention to conditional logic. 
Lewis's main goal in considering preferential structures 
was to capture a counterfactual conditional-, where 
1/J-<p is read as "if 1/J were the case, then <p would be 
true" as in "if kangaroos had no tails, then they would 
topple over". He takes this to be true at a world w 
if, in all the worlds "closest" to w (where closeness is 
defined by a preorder t) where kangaroos don't have 
tails, it is the case that kangaroos topple over.4 
More abstractly, in the case where W is finite, for 
a subset V � W, let min(V) = {v E V : v' >­
v implies v' ¢ V}. Thus, min(V) consists of all worlds 
v E V such that no world v' E V is considered more 
likely than v. (We take min(0) = 0.) 
If W is finite, we define 
(M, w) F 1/J-<p if min([1Ji]M) � ['f']M· 
Thus, 1/J-<p is true exactly if <p is true at the most 
likely (or closest) worlds where rp is true. 
For infinite domains, this definition does not quite cap­
ture our intentions. For example, in Example 2.2, we 
have min(Woo) = 0. It follows that if M =(Woo, t,1r), 
then M I= true--.p even if 11' makes p true at every 
world in W00• We certainly would not want to say that 
�To really deal appropriately with counterfactuals, we 
require not one preorder �. but a possibly different pre­
order �"" for each world w, since the notion of closeness in 
general depends on the actual world. We ignore this issue 
here, since it is somewhat tangential to our concerns. 
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"if true were the case, then p would be false" is true if 
p is true at all the worlds in W 00! The solution here, 
again due to Lewis, is much like that for >-• in infinite 
domains. We then say M I= 1/J-tp if for all u E [1/J]M, 
there exists a world v E [<p 1\ 1/J]M such that v t u 
and v dominates [It> 1\ --.1/J]M- This definition can be 
shown to agree with the definition for the case of finite 
W. Lewis [1973] argues that it captures many of our 
intuitions for counterfactual reasoning. 
We can give - another interpretation, perhaps more 
natural if we are thinking in terms of likelihood. We 
often want to say that <p is more likely than not-in .C, 
this can be expressed as <p » •rp. More generally, we 
might want to say that relative to 1/J, or conditional on 
1/J being the case, <p is more likely than not. By this we 
mean that if we restrict to worlds where 1/J is true, <p is 
more likely than not, that is, the worlds where <p 1\ 1/J 
is true are more likely than the worlds where -.<p 1\ 1/J 
is true. 
Let us define .,P--+1 rp to be an abbreviation for K -.'ljJ V 
( <p 1\ 1/J :» ....,<p 1\ 1/J ). That is, 1/J-' if is true vacuously in 
a structure M if 1/J does not hold in any world in M; 
otherwise, it holds if rp is more likely than not in the 
worlds satisfying 1/J. 
Although the intuition for _, seems, on the surface, 
quite different from that for -, especially in finite do­
mains, it is easy to see that they are equivalent. (This 
connection between --+ and --+1 was already observed 
by Lewis [1973] in the case of total proeorders.) 
Lemma 4.1: For all structures M, we have M f= 
rp-+1/J iff M I= rp--+11/J. 
Given Lemma 4.1, we can write - for both --+ and 
--+1• The lemma also allows us to apply the known re­
sults for conditional logic to the logic of relative likeli­
hood defined here. In particular, the results of [Fried­
man and Halpern 1994] show that the validity problem 
for the logic of Section 3 is co-NP complete, no harder 
than that of propositional logic, for the case of both 
partial and total preorders. 5 
More recently, --+ has been used to capture nonmono­
tonic default reasoning [Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor 
1990; Boutilier 1994]. In this case, a statement like 
Bird-+Fly is interpreted as "birds typically fly", or 
"by default, birds fly". The semantics does not change: 
Bird-Fly is true if in the most likely worlds satisfy­
ing Bird, Fly holds as well. Dubois and Prade [1991] 
have shown that possibility can be used to give seman­
tics to defaults as well, where 1/J-rp is interpreted as 
Poss{ 1/J) = 0 or Poss( <p 1\ 1/J) > Poss( rp A -.'ljJ). Of course, 
this is just the analogue of the definition of --+ in terms 
5We remark that there are also well known axiomatiza­
tions for various conditional logics [Burgess 1981; Friedman 
and Halpern 1994; Lewis 1973]. These do not immediately 
give us a complete axiomatization for the logic of relative 
likelihood considered here, since we must find axioms in 
the language with �. not in the language with -+ . 
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of >-•. Goldszmidt and Pearl [1992] have shown that 
a similar approach works if we use Spohn's OCFs. 
These results are clarified and unified in [Friedman and 
Halpern 1995]. Suppose we start with some mapping 
PI of sets to a partially ordered space with minimal el­
ement j_ (such a mapping is called a plausibility mea­
Jure in [Friedman and Halpern 1995]). Define 1/J-rp 
as Pl(rp) = j_ or Pl('f/J/\tp) > Pl('f/J/\--.rp). Then it is 
shown that - satisfies the KLM properties-the prop­
erties isolated in [Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor 1990) 
as forming the core of default reasoning-if and only 
if Pl is qualitative, at least when restricted to disjoint 
sets.6 Since t•, Pass, and OCFs give rise to qualita­
tive orders on 2w, it is no surprise that they should 
all lead to logics that satisfy the KLM properties. 
5 CONCLUSION 
We have investigated a notion of relative likelihood 
starting with a preferential ordering on worlds. This 
notion was earlier studied by Lewis [1973) in the case 
where the preferential order is a total preorder; the 
focus of this paper is on the case where the preferen­
tial order is a partial preorder. Our results show that 
there are significant differences between the totally or­
dered and partially ordered case. By focusing on the 
partially ordered case, we bring out the key role of the 
qualitative property (axiom L3), whose connections to 
conditional logic were already observed in [Friedman 
and Halpern 1995]. 
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